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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 





GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Lorraine Gress appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
for Appellee, Temple University Health System (“Temple”).  On appeal, Gress argues 
that the District Court failed to view facts in a light most favorable to her, the nonmoving 
party, and erroneously concluded that genuine disputes of material fact did not exist with 
respect to her discrimination claims.  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims.    
I. Factual Background/Procedural History 
Temple hired Gress in 1996 as a medical assistant.  In 1998, Gress was promoted 
to office manager.  In 2007, Gress was promoted to regional manager, and in 2008, she 
was promoted to regional director.  After fourteen years of employment, in January 2010, 
Gress complained to her human resources manager about her supervisor, Renee 
Reedman’s behavior.  According to Gress, Reedman made racially insensitive comments, 
such as calling African-American employees “porch monkeys,” and referred to a lesbian 
employee as a “dyke.”  App. 3.  Additionally, Reedman made comments about Gress’s 
weight in front of coworkers, referenced her daughter’s teen pregnancy, and stated that 
Gress’s home was stuck in the eighties.  Human resources investigated the complaint and 
Gress met with Reedman and Dr. Mankin, the CEO of Temple, to discuss and resolve the 
issues.   
Shortly thereafter in March of 2010, Gress notified human resources that Reedman 
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had embarrassed her by referring to her daughter’s ex-boyfriend as Gress’s son-in-law.  
Despite Gress having lodged these prior complaints, Reedman provided Gress with a 
favorable performance review.  In March 2011, Gress complained again about Reedman 
after Reedman had told another employee, Linda King, that King could not have taken a 
position at another location because of the color of her skin and the fact that such a 
practice is racist.  Human resources investigated the complaint and Reedman apologized 
to King.  Human resources also held a mediation for Gress and Reedman hoping to 
improve their communication with each other.  During her deposition, Gress stated that 
she believed Reedman treated everyone equally regardless of disability or age.  
Gress went on Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave from May 9, 2011 
until August 22, 2011, as she underwent surgery.  During this leave, David Reppert, the 
controller for Temple, found a cash discrepancy in the northeast location where Linda 
King was the office manager.  King was responsible for receiving payments from patients 
and depositing them in the appropriate Temple account.  After an internal investigation 
by human resources manager, Brenda Woods, it was confirmed that cash was missing 
over a three-year period, totaling $130,000.  As the regional director, Gress was King’s 
supervisor and ultimately responsible for auditing King’s financial work. Gress’s auditing 
of King’s work failed to detect any inconsistent deposits.  Following the investigation, 
King was terminated. 
When Gress returned to work following FMLA leave, she was interviewed by 
Woods and James Frank, the director of internal audit.  She admitted that she had allowed 
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office managers, including King, to do two things—select which deposit records would 
be audited and not require confirmation faxes of deposits from the northeast branch.  
App. 65.  Gress was advised that she was being investigated for involvement in the theft.  
Although Gress was told not to discuss the investigation with anyone, Gress discussed the 
investigation with Reedman and Dr. Mankin.  Gress was also advised not to remove any 
documents, yet Gress removed King’s original bank reconciliation documents from a 
locked cabinet for four days and showed them to Reedman and three regional directors at 
an operations meeting where she had discussed the investigation.  Gress stated that the 
documents showed that King was reconciling and Gress was auditing.  App. 165.  
On September 14, 2011, Woods met with Gress and suspended her pending further 
investigation.  Gress’s employment was then terminated on October 10, 2011 based on 
misrepresenting the veracity of fax deposit confirmations from the bank, engaging in 
gross neglect of job duties based on her failure to audit, being insubordinate by 
discussing the ongoing investigation, and interfering with an ongoing investigation by 
removing important financial documents without authorization.  
Following her dismissal, Gress brought claims of discrimination under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634; the FMLA, 29 
U.S.C. § 2601; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12101–12213, 47 U.S.C. § 5; and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(a) and (e).  She also brought claims of retaliation under the 
FMLA, the PHRA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).   The 
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District Court granted summary judgment to Temple on all claims.  Appellant timely 
appeals only her Title VII, ADEA, and corollary age discrimination and retaliations 
claims under the PHRA. 
II. Discussion1 
Gress argues that the District Court erred by not viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to her, the nonmoving party, and failing to conclude that genuine disputes of 
material fact exist.  This Court exercises plenary review over a District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Aruajo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 708 F.3d 152, 156 (3d 
Cir. 2013).  This Court can affirm a grant of summary judgment only if “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A factual dispute is genuine if the “evidence is such that a 
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  A factual dispute is “material” if it “might affect 
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”  Id.  The Court must view the facts and 
evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party.  Id. at 
255.  In attempting to defeat summary judgment, “[s]peculation and conclusory 
allegations do not satisfy [the non-moving party’s] duty.”  Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. 
N.E. ex rel. M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999).  
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  This Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise pendent jurisdiction 
over Appellants’ claims arising under the PHRA, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
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A. Age Discrimination Claim 
Gress argues that she provides enough evidence to overcome summary judgment 
with respect to her ADEA and PHRA age discrimination claims.2  The ADEA establishes 
that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual’s age.”  29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).   
As Gress does not have any direct evidence of age discrimination, she must prove 
it through circumstantial evidence.  See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 691 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  Under the burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, which this Court applies to ADEA claims, Gress must provide enough evidence 
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973); Smith, 589 
F.3d at 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  Gress must first show that she “is forty years of age or older.”  
Smith, 589 F.3d at 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  “[S]econd,” she must show “that the defendant 
took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff” and “third, that [she] was 
qualified for the position in question.”  Id.  Finally, Gress must show that she “was 
ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an 
inference of discriminatory animus.”  Id.  If she satisfies these four prongs, the “burden of 
production shifts to the employer to identify a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment action.”  Id. at 690.  “If the employer does so, the burden of 
                                                 
2 Both the ADEA and the PHRA utilize the same legal standard.  Glanzman v. 
Metropolitan Management Corp., 391 F.3d 506, 509 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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production returns to [Gress] to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered rationale was a 
pretext for age discrimination.”  Id.   
The Supreme Court added a gloss to this standard in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), where it observed that “shifting the burden of persuasion 
to an age discrimination defendant is improper because the plain language of the ADEA 
requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant took the adverse employment action, 
‘because of [the plaintiff’s] age.’”  Smith, 589 F.3d at 690 (quoting Gross, 557 U.S. at 
176).  We reconciled Gross with our jurisprudence in Smith, noting that Gross requires 
the plaintiff to “prove that age was the but-for cause of the defendant’s adverse 
employment action.”  Smith, 589 F.3d at 691 (internal citation omitted). Therefore, we 
still follow the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze ADEA claims with this gloss 
in mind, as the burden returns to the plaintiff in the analysis.  Id.  
As the District Court noted, Gress established three elements of her prima facie 
case: she was 61 years old; she was qualified for her position; and she was terminated. 
Assuming arguendo that she established the fourth element, Gress still cannot overcome 
Temple’s legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for her termination—her failed audit 
supervision resulting in a loss of $130,000, misrepresentations of fax deposit 
confirmations, insubordination by refusing to follow confidentiality instructions during 
her active investigation, and removing documents without authorization.  Any of the 
aforementioned reasons by itself could serve as a legitimate ground for removal.   
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To establish pretext, Gress must provide enough evidence such that a factfinder 
could “infer that each of the employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons . . . was 
either a post hoc fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment 
action . . . .”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations and 
citations omitted).  Gress “must prove not that the illegitimate factor was the sole reason 
for the decision, but that the illegitimate factor was a determinative factor in the adverse 
employment decision.”  Id.  In short, “but for the protected characteristic”—here, Gress’s 
age—she would not have been fired.  Id.  Gress does not assert any facts that establish 
this or suggest evidence of age discrimination.  She argues that the District Court 
incorrectly found that she was told not to remove documents or discuss the investigation.  
Even so, being the supervisor responsible for the loss of $130,000 is a sufficient ground 
for termination when the auditing function was admittedly deficient.  Gress does not 
point to any other evidence that supports her age discrimination claim.  Therefore, the 
District Court was correct in finding that Gress does not allege sufficient facts to establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination under either the ADEA or PHRA.  
B. Retaliation Claim 
Gress also argues that the District Court erred in deciding that she did not make 
out a claim of retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA.3  Under the McDonnell Douglas 
                                                 
3 Title VII's anti-retaliation provision forbids an employer from “discriminat[ing] 
against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title 
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burden-shifting framework, a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under either Title VII 
or the PHRA must first establish a prima facie case by showing (1) she engaged in 
protected activity; (2) suffered adverse action by the employer; and (3) there is a causal 
connection between the employer’s activity and the employer’s adverse action.  
Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Daniels v. 
School Dist. of Philadelphia, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015).  If Gress makes these 
showings, “the burden of production of evidence shifts to the employer to present a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the adverse action.  Id.  “A plaintiff 
claiming retaliation under Title VII must show that a reasonable employee would have 
found the alleged retaliatory actions ‘materially adverse’ in that they ‘well might have 
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”  
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burlington 
Northern & Santa Fe Ty. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).    
The first prong of a prima facie retaliation claim can be satisfied by a showing of 
complaints to the employer.  Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 
2006).  For Gress’s complaints to qualify as protected, she must have held an objectively 
                                                 
VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). The PHRA, which we generally interpret consistently 
with Title VII, likewise forbids employers from retaliating against employees for 
asserting their rights under the PHRA See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d at 567 
(“The language of the PHRA is . . . substantially similar to [Title VII and other federal] 
anti-retaliation provisions, and we have held that the PHRA is to be interpreted as 
identical to federal anti-discrimination laws except where there is something specifically 
different . . . .”) (citing Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
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reasonable, good faith belief that her employer’s activity was unlawful under Title VII.4  
She need not prove the merits of the underlying discrimination complaint, but a 
reasonable person must be able to conclude that there was unlawful discrimination under 
Title VII.  Moore, 461 F.3d at 344. 
Although this Court acknowledges “the message being conveyed rather than the 
means of conveyance” and takes into account “making complaints to management” in 
determining whether Title VII’s opposition clause is triggered, the activity in question 
does not rise to level of a Title VII violation.  Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 
130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006).  “Case law has established that opposition to an illegal 
employment practice must identify the employer and the practice—if not specifically, at 
least by context.”  Id.  As a preliminary matter, Gress asserts no facts identifying specific 
behavior by Reedman that would qualify as unlawful activity.  Gress instead makes 
conclusory statements about Reedman’s actions, claiming she engaged in racial 
harassment and discrimination, gender harassment and discrimination, religious 
discrimination, and disability discrimination.  Gress’s complaints about Reedman’s 
behavior were not about activity she believed to be illegal under Title VII.  Here, Gress 
                                                 
4 Because the District Court concluded that Gress failed to satisfy the first prong 
with respect to her theories of relief, it never addressed the adverse employment action 
and causation prongs of her retaliation claims.  The prongs are conjunctive, therefore 
Gress’s failure to satisfy the first prong causes her claim to fail.  Consequently, we do not 
address those issues here on appeal in the first instance.  Rather, we consider only the 
District Court's treatment of the “protected activity” prongs of Gress’s retaliation claims.  
Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568. 
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also fails to complain about disparate treatment based on her sexual orientation, race, or 
religion.  She never put forth evidence of an illegal employment practice, only asserting 
that Reedman demonstrated “racist actions” and “invidious discrimination.”  Appellant’s 
Br. at 32, 33.5   
As the District Court noted, these statements are rude, but not illegal.  App. 17.  
As Gress has not put forth sufficient evidence to meet the first prong of a retaliation claim 
under Title VII and the PHRA and show she engaged in protected activity, she cannot 
make out a prima facie case for retaliation.  
III. Conclusion 
Gress cannot induce this Court to reverse the District Court’s order.  The facts 
asserted, even when considered in the light most favorable to her are insufficient.  She 
cannot establish a prima facie case for age discrimination under the ADEA or the PHRA.  
She also cannot establish a prima facie case for her retaliation claim under Title VII or 
the PHRA.  For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  
                                                 
5 Assuming Reedman told Linda King that she could not be considered for a job 
because she was African-American, Gress did not suggest at any point that she thought 
Reedman had discriminated against King, or that Reedman was in a hiring position to act 
discriminatorily with respect to King’s interest in another location.  Regardless, Gress 
does not assert a third-party complaint or cause of action.  Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 571.   
